Analysis by Munzer Mustafa | Institute of Public Policy – Sudan
Translated and Expanded from Arabic Original
A significant and contentious shift in international engagement with Sudan occurred in December 2025. The United Nations signed an Interim Cooperation Framework (ICF) for 2026-2028 with the de facto authority based in Port Sudan, formally recognizing it as the Government of Sudan. This move, involving 23 UN agencies, is far more than a bureaucratic arrangement; it represents a profound political realignment with lasting consequences for Sudan’s sovereignty and future.
Critically, the framework designates the Ministry of Finance, led by Gibril Ibrahim, as the sole local partner. It grants the ministry direct control over Strategic Goals 3 (Resilience) and 4 (Localization), while relegating it to an observer role for humanitarian objectives (1 and 2). This structure effectively sidelines traditional humanitarian actors and consolidates financial and developmental authority under a single, politically-aligned ministry. This is a stark departure from the internationally endorsed “Triple Nexus” approach, which seeks to synergize Humanitarian, Development, and Peace efforts. By decoupling these pillars, the agreement risks instrumentalizing aid to serve political consolidation rather than civilian needs.
This UN framework coincides suspiciously with another strategic maneuver: the reinforcement of Turkey’s historical ambitions in the Red Sea. Control over ports like Suakin—a foothold secured in 2017—is not merely commercial; it is a geopolitical lever. For a landlocked authority in Port Sudan dependent on supply lines, Turkish control of logistics infrastructure represents a critical dependency. This “Sultanic” ambition, with roots dating to the 19th century, provides Ibrahim’s faction with a powerful external patron, but at the cost of ceding strategic national assets.
Collectively, these agreements signal a dramatic evolution in the international community’s stance toward the October 25, 2021, coup. The position has morphed from rejection to a form of “silent recognition.” By engaging the Port Sudan authority as a government, the UN is legitimizing one pillar of the post-coup order. This sets a dangerous precedent that could pave the way for recognizing other militant factions, like the Rapid Support Forces (referred to here as “Janjaweed”), over different territories. The ultimate outcome is the formalization of the country’s fragmentation, with Gibril Ibrahim positioned as the primary beneficiary, reaping the fruits of international recognition and resource flows.
To understand the driving ideology, one must examine the “Axis of Evil” perspective—a term used by the author to describe the alliance between Ibrahim’s faction, regional powers like Turkey, and transnational organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood. This axis views Sudan through a colonial lens, as “Terra Nullius” or empty land, where a strong, sovereign civilian government is unnecessary. In this view, control is best maintained through compliant military or militia forces that ensure obedience, reducing the national government to a mere administrative secretariat. Frenzied media campaigns promote this narrative, linking stability solely to military sovereignty and vilifying civilian democratic aspirations supported by actors like Saudi Arabia and the United States.
Minister Gibril Ibrahim’s role is pivotal and is built on three interlocking pillars:
- An Ideological Pillar: A belief in the cultural backwardness of the Sudanese people, framing external control as part of a “Civilizational Project” necessary for progress.
- A Pragmatic Pillar: The deliberate continuation of war as a tool to weaken state institutions and empower a dynastic, militia-based rule, ensuring no civilian alternative can emerge.
- A Visionary Pillar: The active fragmentation of Sudan into spheres of influence to serve as a platform for global Islamist influence—the “Sultanic Brotherhood project.”
Ibrahim has long advocated for a Sudan that serves as an invisible platform for grand ideological projects, where state fragility intersects conveniently with the interests of regional axes that prefer dealing with “warlords.” His current strategy appears designed to be airtight: using the UN ICF as a platform to circumvent the peace efforts of the “Quartet” (likely Saudi Arabia, UAE, USA, and UN). With support from Turkish intelligence, the Ministry of Finance can now use its UN-sanctioned role to “launder” financial legitimacy and secure internationally channeled funding for the next three years—renewable. The irony is profound: the very international entity tasked with upholding peace and sovereignty is being leveraged to fund and entrench a faction opposed to a unified, civilian-led Sudan.
In conclusion, the question “What does the Finance Minister want?” finds its answer in a complex strategy of international legitimization, geopolitical alliance, and ideological consolidation. The UN’s Interim Cooperation Framework is not just an aid agreement; it is a crucial piece in a puzzle aimed at solidifying a new, fragmented political reality in Sudan, with Gibril Ibrahim at its financial helm.
Friday, December 26, 2025
Researcher | Institute of Public Policy – Sudan
Email: [email protected]